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Abstract: The paper applies confirmation theory to a famous statement of 
economics, the law of demand, which says that ceteris paribus, prices and 
quantities demanded change in opposite directions. Today's economists do not 
accept the law unless definite restrictions hold, and have shown little interest in 
deciding whether or not these restrictions were satisfied empirically. However, 
Hildenbrand (1994) has provided a new derivation of the law of aggregate 
demand and used this theoretical advance to devise a test that may be the first 
rigorous one ever performed on the law. The paper accounts for Hildenbrand's 
and, in less detail, his predecessors' contributions within the philosophical 
framework of Hempel (1965) and Glymour (1980). Its salient result is that 
economists have accepted the "consequence condition", and rejected the 
"converse consequence condition", and thus implicitly adhered to a Hempelian-
Glymourian view of confirmation and testability. 
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On the Confirmation of the Law of Demand 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The present paper deals with one of the famous topics of old and modern 
economics — the law of demand. Among the early statements, Marshall's 
(1890) is the most famous. It simply says that the consumer's demand for a 
good varies inversely with its price, given that every other price and the 
consumer's income remain fixed. After Hicks (1939), Samuelson (1947), and 
their post-war followers (Chipman et alii, 1971) rebuilt consumer theory, 
economists stopped claiming the inverse relation of price and demand in 
Marshall's straightforward way. As any microeconomics text explains nowadays, 
a price change triggers out two separate effects on demand which may go in 
opposite directions, with the consequence that the final effect is indeterminate. 
This explains why, despite its obviously strong practical importance and 
possibly high theoretical relevance, the law of demand has virtually disappeared 
from the scene of economics. But there is a recent major exception to this state 
of affairs. A mathematical economist well-known to the profession, Hildenbrand 
(1994) has managed to recover an aggregate version of the law from 
assumptions put on the income distribution. He uses this novel derivation in 
order to carry out an econometric test of the law against consumption data 
provided by national statistics. By and large, Hildenbrand claims that his 
empirical check comforts the time-honoured statement, a conclusion that is the 
more striking since Hildenbrand also argues that economists have never 
attempted a serious test before.  
 
This paper has been motivated by Hildenbrand's findings, but given the 
paucity of philosophy-of-science discussions of the law of demand, I investigate 
it generally, and this leads me to explore consumer theory, one of the best 
structured parts of today's neoclassically inspired microeconomics. I have 
selected my case study despite two slight drawbacks - for one, consumer theory 
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is fairly mathematical, for another, Hildenbrand's programme is still ongoing - 
because it is exceptionally useful to understand how economists conceive of, 
and attempt to solve, the classic problem of the confirmation of scientific 
theories. I carry out the philosophical investigation within the framework of 
Hempel's (1965) tentative requirements for a suitable confirmation concept, 
prominent among which are the consequence condition and the converse 
consequence condition. As these requirements conflict with each other, it 
seems relevant both to confirmation theory and economic methodology to find 
out which of the two effectively prevails when it comes to confirming the law of 
demand. I argue that Hildenbrand puts this duality in sharp focus, and that he 
implicitly endorses the consequence condition and rejects the converse 
consequence condition, exactly as Hempel and his followers, like Glymour 
(1980), would recommend. I briefly extend this Hempelian interpretation to the 
earlier justifications of the law of the demand, and would push it more generally 
for economics if space permitted. 
 
2. Consumer theory and the law of demand 
 
Consumer theory relies on the virtually unique hypothesis that the 
individual consumer maximizes the utility of his basket of goods under the 
constraint set by his money income and the prevailing market prices. This 
hypothesis entails the following theorem due to Slutsky (1915) and developed 
by Hicks (1939): a small change in the price of a good j every other price and 
the consumer's income remaining constant, brings about a change in the 
demand for a good k that decomposes additively into a substitution and an 
income effect. The first effect measures the change in demand while making 
allowance for the change in the consumer's real income induced by the price 
change. The second effect measures the residual, i.e., the change in demand 
resulting from the change in real income. When changes in price and in demand 
relate to the same good, the Maximization Hypothesis entails that the 
substitution effect goes in the direction predicted by the law of demand, i.e., 
price and demand changes have opposite signs. By contrast, the hypothesis 
never restricts the direction of the income effect. In the case of an own price 
change, the latter may run counter to the former, and if large enough, defeat the 
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law. For concreteness, think of an increase in the price of bread, with other 
prices and income remaining constant. The increased cost of bread relative to 
other commodities would lead the consumer to substitute the latter for the 
former if his effective wealth - or real income, to be distinguished from his fixed 
money income - remained the same; however, the consumer is also 
impoverished by the price increase, and the consequence of this underlying 
change is prima facie unpredictable. After all, it may be best for the consumer to 
buy more bread, just because its increased cost makes meat and wine less 
affordable than they were before. This theoretical possibility is central to modern 
consumer theory. 
 
 I now restate these arguments formally, using differential calculus in the 
economists' way.1 Denote by x = (x1,..., x l) ∈R+l  the physically available baskets 
of l  goods, by p = (p1, ..., pl) ∈R+*l  the price vector, and by I  the consumer's 
budget.2 Assuming that he maximizes a utility function u(x) under the budget 
constraint p ⋅ x = I , and that this maximization problem has a well-defined and 
unique solution, one derives a demand function x j (p, I)  for each good j . 
Denote by (p
_
, I
_
) the initial values of prices and income, and consider the 
mapping:   p a s(p, x
_
) = x( p, p ⋅ x
_
)) . The value of s represents the basket of 
goods that the consumer would select at the new price vector p , if, for these 
prices, he could afford the initial basket x
_
= x(p
_
, I
_
)) . The supposition is a 
precise rendering of the vague expression "the consumer's real income is 
unchanged". The mapping s  is called the Slutsky compensated demand 
function because Slutsky (1915) introduced this rendering; an alternative one, 
due to Hicks (1939), will be introduced shortly. To investigate the effect of a 
price change pk  under the ceteris paribus clause that pl , l ≠ k,  and I  are 
constant, we differentiate s  partially with respect to pk , taking into account the 
budget constraint equation (the latter requires that all the budget be spent). 
                                                     
1
 For a fuller exposition, the reader may consult Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).  
2
 The notation R+
l
 and R+*
l
 refers to the nonnegative orthant of the l-dimensional Euclidean 
space, with and without 0  included respectively.    
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Evaluating the derivatives at p = p
_
, we obtain the Slutsky equations, which hold 
for all goods j, k , and all initial values p
_
, I
_
: 
(*) ∂x j (p
_
, I
_)
∂pk
=
∂s j( p
_
, I
_ )
∂pk
−
∂x j (p
_
, I
_)
∂I ⋅ xk( p
−
, I
−)) .3 
Owing to (*), the effect on demand ∆x j  of a small change ∆pk  can be 
decomposed as the sum of two elementary effects: 
∆x j ≈
∂x j( p
_
, I
_)
∂pk
⋅ ∆pk =
∂sj( p
_
, I
_))
∂pk
⋅ ∆pk
 
 
 
 
 
 + −
∂x j (p
_
, I
_ )
∂I ⋅ xk (p
_
, I
_
) ⋅ ∆pk
 
 
 
 
 
  
The first term is the substitution effect, and the second, the income effect; we 
thus have reached the decomposition sketched informally. Notice that the 
additive formula can only hold as an approximation for discrete - as against 
infinitesimal - changes ∆pk . 
 
There is a more famous, but also more complex way of obtaining the 
decomposition. Denote by v
_
 the utility value reached initially, i.e., 
v
_
= u(x
_
) = u(x(p
_
, I
_
)), and consider the mapping   p a h(p, v
_
), which by definition 
associates to p  the demand vector x(p, I)  leading to the utility value v
_
 for an 
appropriately changed I . I.e., the value of h  is the basket of goods that the 
consumer would select at the new prices if his income were adjusted so as to 
keep him at his initial utility level. This supposition delivers an alternative 
rendering of the expression, "the consumer's real income remains unchanged", 
and h  is called the Hicks compensated demand function. Now, the 
Maximization Hypothesis entails that the following equations hold for all goods 
j, k , and all initial values p
_
, I
_
: 
(**) ∂x j (p
_
, I
_)
∂pk
=
∂h j(p
_
, v
_ )
∂pk
−
∂x j (p
_
, I
_)
∂I ⋅ xk (p
_
, I
_
) . 
Comparison with (*) establishes the remarkable result that the Slutsky and 
Hicks compensated demand functions have identical price derivatives. 
Accordingly, for small enough changes ∆pk , it does not matter which way the 
                                                     
3
 I made the innocuous change of notation from s( p
_
, x
_
)  to s( p
_
, I
_
) .  
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substitution effect is defined. Henceforth, I follow the standard practice of 
treating (*) and (**) as if they were the same "Slutsky equations".  
 
These equations can be written in matrix term as MD = M SE + M IE  , 
where (we may drop the bars): 
MD =
∂x j( p, I)
∂pk
 
  
 
  j ,k =1,..., l
, M SE =
∂s j(p, I)
∂pk
 
  
 
  j, k =1,..., l
, M IE = −
∂x j( p, I)
∂I ⋅ xk( p, I)
 
  
 
  j ,k =1,..., l
. 
The Maximization Hypothesis entails that the substitution effect matrix MD  is 
negative definite, but does not restrict the income effect matrix M IE .4 If j = k , 
the approximation formula becomes: 
∆x j ≈
∂sj( p, I)
∂pj
⋅ ∆p j
 
  
 
  
+ −
∂x j( p, I)
∂I ⋅ x j(p, I) ⋅ ∆pj
 
  
 
  
, 
and the negative definiteness of MSE  implies that the own substitution effect is 
negative, while the own income effect can be of any sign. If the latter is positive 
(i.e., if ∂x j (p, I)∂I < 0 ) and its magnitude (which also depends on x j(p, I) ⋅ ∆pj ) 
exceeds the magnitude of the substitution effect, the total effect will be positive. 
This formally explains why consumer theory does not recover the traditional law 
of demand, as Cournot, and more famously, Marshall expounded it: 
"There is then one general law of demand: -The greater the amount to be sold, 
the smaller must be the price at which it is offered in order that it may find 
purchasers; or, in other words, the amount demanded increases with a fall in 
price, and diminishes with a rise in price" (1890-1920, p. 84) .5 
 
The older economists were fully aware that their broad statement 
needed qualifying. Marshall (ibid., p. 84-85 and 94-95) lists a number of cases 
where the law fails, regrettably without clarifying the difference between genuine 
                                                     
4
 A l × l  matrix M  is negative definite if for all v ∈ R l , v' ⋅M ⋅ v < 0,and negative semi-
definite, if for all  v ∈ R
*
l
, v' ⋅M ⋅ v ≤ 0 (where v'  is v  in transposed form). 
5
 Cournot (1838-1974, p. 85) antidates Marshall by far, but his statement is less detailed.  
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exceptions and failures of the appended ceteris paribus clause.6 Economists 
have always known that vintage wines, fancy clothes, or luxurious carriages, 
might sell better at higher prices, and they have long realized that increasing 
wages do not always affect the demand for labour negatively. In due course, 
they observed that rallies on stock markets could attract buyers instead of 
repelling them. For a long time, they simply put aside the problematic classes of 
luxuries, factors of production, and speculative buying. Today's theorists take a 
more systematic attitude, if possible by handling exceptions in terms of strong 
positive income effects, more commonly however, by amending consumer 
theory itself. Thus, for luxuries, they make the "signalling" assumption that on 
some range of high values, prices enter the utility function directly. Within the 
same class, or taken as another group, fashion goods can be accommodated 
by the other non-standard assumption that preferences are ex post influenced 
by consumption. As to speculative buying, economists enrich the static 
framework of consumer theory with future periods in which buyers become 
sellers; only after this modelling change does the Slutsky decomposition 
become relevant again. That other prominent class, factors of production, is 
more simply discarded as being out of scope. According to the current 
categorization, consumer theory deals with the demand for final goods alone, 
and it is incumbent on the theory of the firm to investigate the demand for 
factors of production.  
 
In sum, the more obvious exceptions to the old law are still exceptions 
for consumer theory. They call for special explanations in which the Slutsky 
equations play a subordinate rôle if they come in at all. One way of assessing 
the added value of consumer theory would be to find violations of the law where 
this theory applies without too much discrepancy, so that positive income 
effects would provide the bulk of the explanation. Here is a possible example - 
the so-called Giffen goods, which are defined by the following characteristics: (i) 
they are inferior, i.e., the demand for them varies inversely with income, every 
price remaining constant; (ii) the consumer has a low income and devotes a 
                                                     
6
 Here I take Marshall's ceteris paribus clause to be the same as that of today's theory, i.e., to 
refer to prices and income only. Alternative interpretations have been offered.  
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large amount of it to these goods; (iii) they have close substitutes. The name for 
these goods comes from the 19th century English civil servant whom Marshall 
(1890-1920, p. 109-110) credited for identifying them. Ever since Marshall, 
Giffen goods have been a matter of dispute: first of all, do they exist at all, or 
are they just a theoretical possibility? Second, if they exist, do they give rise to 
an actual failure of the law, or is this failure a theoretical possibility? Marshall 
seemed to have little doubt that Giffen goods existed but did not clearly say 
whether upward sloping demand curves had been observed for them. It is part 
of the folklore of economics that the poor Irish workers in 19th century Midlands 
would consume more bread when the price of bread increased. However, 
careful investigations shed a doubt on the available evidence; it is not even 
clear how Giffen would have had a chance of recording it. The few related 
examples in the literature are hardly more telling.7 This explains why the 
founders of modern consumer theory, Hicks and Samuelson, take an 
ambiguous attitude towards the "Giffen case" or "Giffen paradox". Granting the 
real existence of Giffen goods, if they had an upward sloping demand curve, 
they would provide fascinating evidence for the theory; since the mathematical 
assumptions needed for a strong own positive income effect roughly correspond 
to (i) and (ii). Unfortunately, it is impossible to go beyond this conditional 
statement as long as the empirical issue is not sorted out, and given the 
constraints on consumption data and the heavy ceteris paribus clause, this may 
well never happen.    
 
There is an alternative way of relating consumer theory to the law of 
demand that, if consistently pursued, would do justice to the contribution of this 
theory. Instead of searching for exceptions outside the established list, 
economists could conceivably use the Slutsky equations as a theoretical 
warrant for the law within the limits set by the list. Hicks's late treatment (1956, 
ch. VII) is exemplary for this  attitude. He stresses that a diversified consumer 
cannot spend much of his income on any inferior good j  in particular, which 
means that the positive income effect of such a good cannot be large either. For 
concreteness, Hicks supposes that the consumer spends a 5% fraction of I  on 
                                                     
7
 Stigler (1947) dismissed all existing historical evidence. The issue is still hotly debated. 
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sugar and the price of this commodity is halved. The income difference that 
compensates - in the sense (*) - for the real income increase is thus equal 2,5% 
of I , which means that the income effect cannot exceed the effect on the 
demand for sugar of a 2,5% rise in I . Such a small rise must be spread out on 
all goods, which leads Hicks to conclude: "we are justified in saying that the 
income-effect is normally very small" (1956, p. 65). This is how Hicks reaches 
the conclusion that, if the Slutsky equations hold, the law of demand is "in 
practice likely to hold" (1956, p. 66). Underlying the argument is an admixture of 
theoretical reasoning, computation, and sheer commonsense, that is typical of 
the way economists proceed when they lack detailed evidence. 
 
Consistently with his attempted justification, Hicks argues that the level 
of aggregation over goods matters a great deal to the empirical confirmation of 
the law. Since income effects depend on the amount spent, they are stronger 
for goods grouped together than taken in isolation, as in the previous sugar 
example. Accordingly, observed violations of the law may be due to a 
measurement problem. Available consumption data rely on classifying goods 
into broad categories such as food, clothing, travel, and for these artificially 
constructed commodities the magnitude of the income effect can become quite 
large. If the construct has the property of an inferior good, this effect will be 
positive, with the consequence that a Giffen-like exception may emerge from 
the data.    
 
It is not easy to assess the all-considered view of the law of demand 
among today's economists, but I would conclude that most of them take it to be 
empirically acceptable within its established limits. Rather than taking the 
Slutsky equations as a way of uncovering significant exceptions, they use them 
to argue that exceptions are bound to be rare. The law, it is sometimes said, 
holds true of "ordinary consumer goods" for "an ordinary consumer's budget". 
This ill-defined statement is meant to exclude all troublesome cases at once, 
i.e., (a) luxuries, fashions, and speculative goods, because they weigh little in 
the budget; (b) factors of production, because they are irrelevant to the 
consumer; (c) Giffen goods if they ever exist and have upward sloping demand 
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curves. Only specialists are aware of the problem created by aggregation over 
commodities.  
 
Philosophers of science will probably be struck by the shallow basis on 
which the economists' conviction lies. This is how things often go in the field. 
Cournot and Marshall should be forgiven for discussing the law and its 
exceptions casually, but the cavalier attitude has persisted virtually up to now. 
Although suggestive, Hicks's argument is far from compelling. I did not invoke 
Samuelson because he refrained from taking sides, being content with the 
analytical claim that "it is not possible to deduce [from the Slustky equations] ... 
the ordinary expression for the law of demand" (1947, p. 115). Hicks and 
Samuelson were theorists, but the 20th century gap between theoretical and 
applied economics cannot serve as an excuse because even applied 
economists have neglected the law of demand. They concentrate on estimating 
and testing the Slutsky and associated relations; they also investigate 
straightforward empirical claims, e.g., that consumers spend on food 
proportionally less the richer they are. The authoritative summary of 
econometric evidence by Deaton and Mullbauer (1980) does not discuss the 
law. What these authors call the "law of demand" (in quotes, p. 44 and 51) is 
the statement that the own substitution effect is negative. Phlips's (1983), 
Blundell's (1988) and Chiappori's (1990) surveys similarly omit the topic. This is 
the more curious since some of the reported evidence could be used as a step 
towards the missing test. For instance, it helps to estimate the so-called Engel 
curves, which relate the consumers' demand to their income, prices being fixed, 
because this identifies inferior goods. Generally, before Hildenbrand's work, I do 
not know of any sustained attempt to substantiate the view that the law holds to 
a satisfactory degree of approximation. 
 
I complete this overall discussion by resolving two semantic ambiguities. 
The first relates to the very meaning of the expression "law of demand" in 
today's writings. With typical nonchalance, economists employ this to mean 
three different things, i.e., (a) the traditional law (Hicks's and Samuelson's use), 
(b) the property that the own substitution effect is negative (Deaton and 
Muellbauer's use), and finally, another mathematical statement (c) I now 
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introduce. Suppose that prices change from p
_
 to p , the consumer's income 
being constant, so that x(p
_
, I
_
)  and x(p, I
_
)  are the corresponding demand 
vectors. Then, the following inequality: 
(***) (p − p− ) ⋅ (x(p, I− ) − x( p− , I− )) < 0   
relates the two vectors of changes in prices and quantities. Geometrically, it 
says that the vectors point in opposite directions of the l-dimensional commodity 
space.8 If the change takes place in p j  alone, the inequality provides a discrete 
version of the traditional law. As this comparison shows, to redefine the law by 
(***) alleviates Marshall's ceteris paribus clause; now, only the consumer's 
income has to be fixed. I need this generalized version of the law of demand 
because Hildenbrand specializes in it. This is unsurprising given his testing 
purposes. Beside the handier ceteris paribus clause, there may be an 
advantage related to the point that the law of demand fares badly when goods 
are grouped together; presumably, a test of the one-good law would involve a 
fair amount of aggregation of this kind. Hildenbrand also has theoretical reasons 
for preferring (***), but they do not belong to the present paper.9 
 
Here is the second, more subtle semantic problem: does the law of 
"consumer" demand relate to the individual or some aggregate of individuals? 
Cournot envisaged only the market demand, in which Marshall also was 
primarily interested. This should not be taken to mean that these two 
economists disbelieved that there were individual demand laws. On the 
contrary, there is definite evidence that Marshall conceived of the law as being 
well-established  granted the exceptions  at the individual level. He 
certainly believed that collective demand functions smoothed out irregularities, 
but this is a different point  his statement only requires the function to be 
decreasing, not differentiable or even continuous. Similarly, nothing can be 
                                                     
8
 Hicks (1956, p. 139) first introduced (***) as another form of the law of demand. An earlier 
version of his involved h j(p, v
− )  instead of x j (p, I)  (1939-1946, p. 52).  
9
 The law in generalized form has implications for the stability of general equilibrium, while it 
has none in its one-good form.   
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concluded from Hicks's often-quoted claim that "a study of individual demand is 
only a means to the study of market demand" (1939-1946, p. 34). Most of the 
passage is in fact concerned with the individual consumer (e.g., p. 32). Even his 
later work is oriented the same way. From this brief survey, I conclude that the 
influential writers have never called into question that there was a sense, both 
theoretical and empirical, in placing the law of demand at the individual level.    
 
They follow the strategy of establishing, first, a suitably qualified version 
of the law at the individual level, and then and only then, moving to the 
aggregate levels of the given market, or the economy, as a whole. The resulting 
aggregative law may call for qualifications  in terms of both ceteris paribus 
clauses and exceptions  different from those required by the individual law. 
The former may be easier to formulate and better supported empirically, but the 
latter would be no less of a putative law for that. Admittedly, economists often 
replace the individual unit by the household. As long as they do not analyze this 
entity, the shift remains verbal. Some have proposed to reconstruct the 
household's demand function as the collective (and in part unintended) result of 
prior interactions between its members. If the law of demand held true of the 
redefined functions, it would be genuinely collective; however, much remains to 
be done in order to extend consumer theory in this direction (see, e.g., 
Browning and Chiappori, 1998).  
 
Following a less detailed, but more widespread, non-individualistic 
construction of the law, it emerges at the market level, while being false as a 
generality when taken at the individual level. This interpretation has been 
offered as a commentary on the existing work by Hausman: the law, he writes, 
is "a generalization about markets, not individuals" (1992, p. 28). This and 
related statements, like Becker's (1962), may point out the direction of future 
success, but they do not capture the present orthodoxy of consumer theory. 
They cannot be taken to describe what Marshall, Samuelson, and Hicks put into 
that theory. If Hildenbrand stresses that the law of demand should be 
reconstructed as an aggregate phenomenon, this is precisely because this line 
was never consistently pursued before.  
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3. Hildenbrand's programme and contribution 
 
In Market Demand (1994) and related pieces, Hildenbrand distances 
himself from the standard treatment on two scores I have already touched on. 
First, he argues that consumer theory does not give a sufficient theoretical and 
empirical basis for accepting the law of demand. He states his complaint as 
follows: "I am afraid that all properties that have been formulated so far for 
individual demand functions, for example, the hypothesis of utility maximization 
or the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference,10 are entirely grounded on a priori 
reasoning" (1994, p. 12). When reading this, philosophers should bear in mind 
that economists never use "a priori" in the technical acceptation of "being true or 
false independently of all experience". Over and beyond propositions, such as 
linguistic truths, which satisfy this sense, economists mean a wide class of 
empirical propositions. The latter have the distinctive feature that only the 
existing stock of knowledge, whatever its origin, supports the claims made 
about their truth or falsehood. These propositions have not given rise to 
specially devised investigations, and in particular, were never tested. Hence, by 
criticizing "a priori" defences of the law of demand, Hildenbrand excludes both 
linguistically-based arguments for the law of demand (some were influential in 
the Austrian tradition of economics), and incomplete empirical defences (the 
main representative being Hicks's argument in last section).11   
 
Breaking away from "a priori" reasoning thus conceived, Hildenbrand 
aims at providing the law with the genuine test it never had. However, in order 
to reach this target, Market Demand follows a heavily theoretical strategy which 
comes as a surprise, given the straightforward empiricism of his critique. 
Hildenbrand argues for his roundabout approach on the ground that the law of 
demand, even in the generalized form, cannot be tested directly: "The Law of 
Demand ... does not refer to the actual evolution of prices, but to hypothetical 
changes within the same period" (1994, p. 5). I understand this terse statement 
                                                     
10
 After Samuelson, economists sometimes take one of the revealed preference axioms as 
alternatives to the Maximization Hypothesis; see below. 
11
 The analysis of the economic a priori in this paragraph draws on Mongin (2005). 
 14 
as follows. It takes time for any real consumer to express his demand vector as 
a reaction to prices and income, which poses a first obstacle to the test, since 
many things  not only price-income variables, but even the consumer's utility 
function  may change from one period to another. Now, one may take the 
periods to be so short that they exclude any disturbing change. In other words, 
with a suitably small time unit, each period's empirical price-demand schedule 
can meaningfully be compared with the theoretical mapping 
  
p ja x j (p, I
−)). But 
this only leads to a second obstacle: the smaller the time unit, the fewer the 
available observations. In the limit, there will be a single price-demand pair 
observed for any given period; any other price-demand pair is "hypothetical" in 
the sense of not belonging to the empirical scheme of that period. Hildenbrand's 
view amounts to a dilemma: if the time unit chosen for statistical measurement 
is too long, the test is impossible, and if it is too short, the test is also 
impossible. 
 
What I have described as a dilemma, others would describe as a trade-
off. There may be a value of the time-unit that reduces both horns to an 
acceptable level of inconvenience; applied economists may sensibly conclude 
that three or six months approximate the optimal trade-off, and these are the 
time units effective in many consumption studies. I do not want to push this 
objection too far because, if pressed, Hildenbrand could call important 
pragmatic reasons to the rescue. The evidence on consumption is roughly 
divided between time series, which are data relative to different time periods, 
and cross-sectional data, which relate to different households within the same 
time period. The most revealing time series, called panel data, follow the same 
households' consumption at different times. Although panel data are becoming 
increasingly available, and are now specially favoured by consumption 
theorists, the bulk of evidence is still made out of either cross-sectional data or 
time-series relative to changing populations; both are indeed common in 
national statistics. The latter involve, or may involve, changes in too many of 
those variables  the households' incomes, utility functions, and identities  
which a test of the law of demand requires one to keep fixed. It makes things 
worse that time-series do not normally exhibit sufficient variation in the price 
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and quantity variables which are the objects of the statistical investigation 
(Hildenbrand, 1994, p. 9; see also Deaton and Mullbauer, 1980). There remain 
cross-sections, which have the single defect of letting the households' identities 
change. All of Hildenbrand's tests are based on these data. Instead of claiming 
that the law of demand is by itself untestable, he could argue that it is 
pragmatically better to test it indirectly because (i) cross-sectional data are the 
only ones that are both widespread and usable, and (ii) a test based on these 
data is of necessity indirect (since it involves considering different individuals, 
contrary to the law).  
 
I move to Hildenbrand's second disagreement with today's conception of 
the law of demand. He believes that if it ever approximates an empirical truth, 
this can only be at the market level. "The Law of Demand does not refer to the 
demand of an individual household, but to market demand, that is to say, to the 
mean demand of a large population of households, for example to all private 
households in Germany or the United Kingdom" (1994, p. 3-4). In view of the 
last section, this claim clashes with consumer theory. So it comes as a surprise 
that Hildenbrand finds support in Hicks: "The market [income effect] is the sum 
of the individual I's... For [this effect] to be negative, there must be a balance of 
negativeness among the individual I's that compose it... The probability of 
exceptional cases is diminished when we take a large group of heterogeneous 
consumers together" (1956, p. 136). As Hildenbrand (1989, p. 258-259) himself 
notes, this passage means a gesture without serious consequence. It is typical 
of the way economists often toy with theoretical possibilities that they do not 
really entertain.12 
 
Now to the programme explicitly stated. It preserves the conventional 
distinction between a negatively signed substitution effect and a nondescript 
income effect. Pursuing Hicks's glimpse in his way, Hildenbrand finds out that 
the income distribution might have the favourable consequence of wiping out 
positive income effects. "Aggregating individual demand over a large group can 
                                                     
12
 Becker's (1962) sketch of an argument for the aggregate law of demand is another example 
to the point.    
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lead to properties of the market demand function which, in general, individual 
demand functions do not possess. There is a qualitative difference in market 
and individual demand functions" (1983, p. 998). Hildenbrand's belief is based 
on a simple calculation that might have provided the heuristic for his whole 
research programme. If all consumers have the same utility function and the 
income density is uniform over 0,1[ ], it follows that the average income effect is 
non-positive.13 Of course, in any relevant community, utility functions will differ 
across individuals, and the statistical distribution of income is unlikely to 
conform with the uniform assumption. But the unrealistic case disposes of the 
theoretical preconception that to move the law from the individual up to the 
market level can only mean further trouble. The challenge becomes to explore 
the class of statistical distributions that deliver a negative average income 
effect. This is a purely theoretical move, but depending on whether acceptably 
realistic distributions are found in the class, it may lead to an empirical 
grounding of the law of market demand. A distinctive feature of the resulting 
programme is that income effects become the sole object of attention. Hicks's 
hint was compatible with the different, actually much more Hicksian, strategy of 
establishing that aggregate income effects are small in magnitude relative to 
corresponding substitution effects. At the individual level, Hicks is prepared to 
strike a balance between effects of opposite signs; similarly when he considers 
the collective level.  
 
Compared with the 1983 paper, which exemplifies Hildenbrand's 
heuristic, his 1994 book reveals a shift in the way he captures the statistical 
element of the law. Instead of putting his asssumptions on the income 
distribution directly, he now makes them on the functional dependence between 
variations in income and the statistical diversity of consumption. This more 
sophisticated strategy leaves him within the confines of the programme, 
because he still aims at showing that aggregate income effects are non-
positive. There are two versions of the new approach, which differ in how they 
                                                     
13
 Here is the calculation: 
− x j
0
1
∫ ( p, I).
∂x j(p, I)
∂I .dI = −
1
2
∂x j2 (p, I)
∂I .dI0
1
∫ = −
1
2
x j
2 (p,1) − x j2 ( p, m)[ ]= − 12 x j2 (p,1) ≤ 0.   
 17 
define the functional dependence just stated. Hildenbrand's condition of 
Increasing Spread of Household Demand is a less transparent measure of 
statistical variation than his alternative condition of Increasing Dispersion of 
Household Demand, but it leads to simpler mathematics, which is why I 
selected it here. (When I say, following Hildenbrand, "household" instead of 
"individual", this is just a nominal change motivated by the fact that statistical 
data concern households, not individuals.) 
 
Hildenbrand's target of analysis is the generalized law of demand (***), and the 
prices changes considered in this statement are discrete, which blocks direct 
comparison with the Slutsky equations (*) or (**). However, (***) can be shown 
to be equivalent to the property that the matrix MD  be negative definite, a 
property which implies the Marshallian law in differential form:  
∂x j (p, I)
∂p j
< 0, j = 1, ..., l  .  
In view of this restatement, the Slutsky equations deliver a sufficient condition 
for (***) to hold. Returning to the matrix form of these equations, we know that 
MSE  is negative definite. Hence, it is sufficient for the generalized law that  the 
other term M IE  be negative definite. 
  
Conveniently, both the generalized law and the Slutsky equations keep 
the same linear form whether they bear on household demand functions or the 
average or sum of these functions. Hildenbrand's analysis goes in terms of 
average uncompensated and compensated demand functions: 
X j (p) =
1
P
x j
i
i ∈P
∑ (p, I i) , S j( p) =
1
P
sj
i
i ∈P
∑ (p, I i) . 
Here, xi  and s j
i
 stand for household i's uncompensated and compensated 
demand functions, I i  for i's fixed income, P  for the set of households, and P  
for their number. It is routine to reformulate (*), (**), an
ERROR: syntaxerror
OFFENDING COMMAND: --nostringval--
STACK:
